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1. Introduction 
 
Up until some years ago, research on populism constituted a rather esoteric and iso-
lated subfield of political science associated with flamboyant presidents in the global 
periphery or with raucous but politically inconsequential figures in “core” Western na-
tions. The aura of aberrance that accompanied the term had allowed several main-
streams scholars to prematurely declare countries such as the United States, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Spain virtually immune to the populist challenge, 
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either due to the structural, “centripetal” advantages of their party systems or because 
of one appeasing feature of their domestic political culture or another. 
While this illusion lasted – for roughly twenty-five years after the end of the Cold 
War – populists were “othered” bimodally, with the Atlantic Ocean erecting an insur-
mountable border of analytical disunity when it came to grasping the “true” empirical 
expression of the phenomenon. Specialists of the Western hemisphere heard “popu-
lism” and turned to the disturbing electoral advances of the Latin American left, with 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez holding the banner for the “pink tide.” Europeanists re-
sponded to the same cue by turning to the opposite side of the political spectrum, put-
ting the fledgling – but still electorally feeble – radical right in Western Europe in their 
crosshairs, with France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen serving as bête noire. 
Conceit was replaced by trepidation when the two nations traditionally advertised as 
stalwart stewards of liberal democracy and role models for the developing world were 
shaken by major and largely unanticipated populist gains. Donald Trump won the 2016 
United States election, and the Brexit referendum upended the political landscape in 
the United Kingdom, ushering Boris Johnson into power. Moreover,  anti-immigrant 
parties in countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Sweden, and Austria, greatly 
improved their electoral fortunes in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis. Adding insult 
to injury, radical left parties in Greece and Spain made headway during the Eurozone 
crisis, gnawing further into the ailing liberal consensus among conservatives and social 
democrats.  
Eventually, after enough influential pundits had employed the term “populism” to 
encapsulate this unprecedented affront to mainstream politics, academics followed 
suit, thus significantly expanding the concept’s empirical application. All of a sudden, 
populism researchers gained popularity with academic publishers, journal editors, and 
lay opinion makers, and the ensuing barrage of scholarly production contributed reams 
of published material atop an already weighty body of work. Yet, quantity came at the 
expense of conceptual clarity. Even had the idea of a consensus on populism’s concep-
tual perimeter not already been de rigeur prior to 2015, to try and tame a scholarship 
running amok to incorporate a flurry of new empirical instances seems today utterly 
preposterous. 
Fresh cohorts of zealous Ph.D. students just beginning to delve into populism’s con-
ceptual depths are understandably throwing up their hands in dismay with this state of 
affairs. For the reasons just outlined, it would however be dishonest to profess the ex-
istence of a concise and universally accepted “authoritative” theory of populism that 
could alleviate such anxieties. Coming to terms with this absence by attempting at least 
to clear some of the dust produced by the warring camps in the field seems like a more 
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viable undertaking. To serve this modest goal, I here suggest that instead of the usual, 
inductive route followed by most literature reviewers, we take a path of inquiry that is 
somewhat circuitous but at the same time offers better intuition and a sounder organ-
izing principle, all the while remaining grounded to the concept’s historical origins.1 I 
thus aim to avoid the danger of falling victim to a circumstantial appreciation of popu-
list dynamics that will expire as soon as the current political setting changes and pun-
dits switch to a different specter of choice in lieu of populism. 
My deductive approach is based on summoning the figure of William Jennings Bryan 
to be used as a basis for conceptual work. Revisiting Populism’s historical inception in 
the 1890s, I draw on existing literature to elicit tacit reactions for the widespread con-
viction that Bryan represents the first and most iconic populist contender. I aim to 
show that by studying how current schools of thought on populism are forced to cater 
for this archetypal case we can deduce where these schools stem from, how their epis-
temologies were shaped to respond to pressing empirical developments, and why they 
seem to be in such permanent tension with each other. 
Providing a useful taxonomy for the academic literature on populism constitutes the 
first goal of the article. The second is to contribute to a deepening of this literature’s 
analytical potential by promoting cultural approaches to the study of populist mobiliza-
tion. While not denying the importance of culture at the level of party politics, I con-
tend that scholars should primarily focus on exploring the interplay of populism and 
culture in the field of social mobilization. Grassroots forms of political contention rou-
tinely rely on cultural cues to construct populist collective action frames that will reso-
nate with citizens, a mechanism that practitioners of the field have so far failed to give 
proper attention. I suggest that by wedding a theory of populism as a discursively con-
structed mode of political identification with methods from frame analysis as practiced 
in the field of social movement studies, we can address this lacuna and move toward 
incorporating culture into the analysis of populist phenomena. 
 
 
2. Why was William Jennings Bryan a populist? 
  
Despite its etymological roots in Latin, populism is a thoroughly American word, 
coined in the 1890s as a catchy neologism, a moniker first used for the members and 
supporters of the United States People’s Party in the absence of an official partisan 
 
1 For recent surveys of the field, see Abromeit (2017); Moffitt (2016), pp. 17-27; Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2017), pp. 2-9; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018); Rooduijn (2019); Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 
(2017); Woods (2014). 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(1) 2020: 59-82, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p59 
  
62 
 
designation. Derided as a bunch of cranks and radicals by both Democrats and Republi-
cans, the People’s Party arose from the experience of the agrarian movement of the 
Farmers’ Alliances in the South and Midwest whose numerous members decided to 
cease relying on lobbying the two major parties for redress. Based on a radically pro-
gressive platform, they opted instead to establish a third party to contest elections at 
the local, state, and federal level (Goodwyn 1976; Hicks 1931; Hofstadter 1955; Postel 
2007).  
It has now become commonplace in handbooks and literature reviews to refer to the 
People’s Party as the first populist movement in history, yet researchers rarely go be-
yond a hurried recognition to delve into the voluminous scholarship on this most fasci-
nating episode. It is only die-hard experts of (capital-P) Populism who can readily sum-
mon up the names of the party’s first senators or its nominees for the 1892 Presiden-
tial election. The one name that instinctively comes to most minds is that of William 
Jennings Bryan, the archetypal populist orator who was the Democratic candidate for 
president in 1896 while also enjoying the parallel endorsement of the Populists. Bryan 
crisscrossed the country to deliver fiery oratories, but his eventual defeat sealed the 
fate of the People’s Party and the wider Populist cause. Nevertheless, his passionate 
“Cross of Gold” speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in July 1896 
has gone down in history as perhaps the most representative populist speech ever de-
livered by a major party presidential nominee. 
Interestingly, there are several issues with a knee-jerk association of Populism with 
the figure of Bryan, especially when taking into account the conceptual dimensions of 
populism as we understand them today. This bright, eloquent, well-connected, and 
well-educated Nebraskan – son of a senator and judge – was not the political maverick 
one would assume. In fact, he was just thirty years old when first elected to the House 
of Representatives in 1890, and that was not with any obscure political organization 
but with the oldest political party in the country, the Democratic Party itself. Bryan was 
subsequently nominated three times for president in 1896, 1900, and 1908, but he lost 
every time, ultimately serving as President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State from 
1913 to 1915. 
On the other hand, Bryan’s Republican nemesis in the first two elections, William 
McKinley, was a devout Protestant of humble rural origins, the son of a pig-iron manu-
facturer who never graduated from college. McKinley first campaigned for nomination 
under the motto “McKinley against the bosses” (Klinghard 2005). He was a resolute ad-
vocate of the protective tariff and he proudly proclaimed to have founded his political 
economy more “upon the everyday experience of the puddler or the potter than the 
learning of the professor” (quoted in Glad 1964, 23-24). Based on these outward ap-
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pearances, one could draw the conclusion that McKinley fits the populist bill better. Yet 
it is Bryan, the “Great Commoner”, who is most frequently invoked as the earliest and 
quintessential populist political leader. Technically though, Bryan spent his whole life 
as a dedicated Democrat. He never enlisted in the People’s Party, the “official” Popu-
lists of the era, even after they chose him for their 1896 Presidential ticket. Bryan’s lack 
of genuine Populist credentials was not lost on his enemies within the People’s Party 
though, and his nomination in 1896 was only a matter of strategic consideration in the 
face of the party’s dwindling electoral prospects. Even so, the fateful decision to sup-
port the Democratic candidate did not go uncontested, as anti-fusionist Populists angri-
ly branded Bryan “an enemy to the People’s Party” (Argesinger 1974, 199), declaring 
his platform to be a selective cooptation of their own and his nomination to be a be-
trayal of Populist ideals. Why, then, do we take for granted that Bryan was the “real” 
populist and McKinley simply another Republican? 
It is this very question that could serve as the basis upon which criteria for a populist 
litmus test can be articulated, thereby conditioning the inclusion of various parties and 
leaders into the populist set. Was Bryan a populist or not, and why? If yes, which spe-
cific dimensions of our theoretical framework allow us to recognize him as such? If not, 
how do we justify excluding such a widely perceived ideal-typical case (cf. Goertz 
2006)? 
Schematically, I suggest grouping plausible answers under three main categories. 
First, in the same way we would use “Republican” as a partisan label in the American 
context, we can prioritize a strict requirement for party affiliation and instruct that 
populist identity is exclusively reserved for People’s Party supporters and those with 
official positions within its formal apparatus. Secondly, resembling how we generically 
understand the terms “conservative” or “socialist”, we can expand populism beyond 
the pre-established confines of the People’s Party to further include politicians and 
other individuals whose political ideology corresponds to the Populist creed and its pol-
icy ramifications. The quest would then revolve around whether Bryan was a genuine 
populist ideologue at heart, irrespective of his nominal partisan identity. Finally, we can 
claim that official membership and political ideology are unable to capture the true 
spectrum of the phenomenon: there was something in Bryan’s outward behavior – his 
rhetorical tropes, his personal style, his campaign gimmicks, etc. – so resembling of the 
Populist experience that it warrants adding him to the populist set. 
The whole purpose of this admittedly heuristic exercise is to consult existing concep-
tual declarations with the aim of “brute-forcing” how scholars determine Bryan’s popu-
list status, and then to use these hypothetical answers as a compass for classification 
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purposes. In the next three sub-sections I will attempt to map out these orienting 
thoughts onto the existing literature. 
 
 
2.1 Historicist and Structuralist Interpretations 
 
Devoted historians of the People’s Party will claim that the term “Populism” should 
always retain its capitalization in order to denote historical specificity. Populism existed 
as a singular, history-bound episode in American politics. It may have had consequenc-
es and implications, and subsequent movements may have superficially resembled it 
one way or another, but Populism reflected a unique worldview that cannot re-emerge 
outside the specific sociopolitical forces that produced it and determined its political 
trajectory. Populism was born within the Farmers’ Alliances and died when the Peo-
ple’s Party folded, and if Bryan deserves the label, it is solely by virtue of his historical 
role as the champion of the Populist cause in the eyes of American society. It is simply 
ahistorical, this school of thought maintains, to distill from American Populism such a 
thing as small-p populism to be affixed to sundry political phenomena in the United 
States or, worse, around the world. The contemporary application of “populism” is 
therefore an unacceptable abstraction, a Procrustean attempt by social scientists in 
pursuit of forced comparative operations. 
This strict historicist rationale just summarized above is currently only espoused by a 
minority of researchers. However, it is not entirely indefensible, in that it is indeed re-
flective of the epistemological gulf separating the humanities from the comparative so-
cial sciences. Its value lies in presenting a cautious reminder of the dangers of haphaz-
ardly abstracting social-scientific concepts from rich and complex historical phenomena 
to then squeeze them into formal models of limited dimensionality.  
Somewhat more influential and less draconian is a variant of the same family which 
contains useful traces of comparative potential. Again dear mostly to historians as well 
as a few sociologists and political scientists, this conceptual platform acknowledges the 
primacy of the Populist phenomenon while allowing room for other “populisms” that 
bear a resemblance to the original movement. On the one hand, close proximity to the 
main policy planks of the Omaha platform of 1892 can justify including a subsequent 
political phenomenon into the Populist tradition. On the other hand – and most im-
portantly – the proper socio-historical context must be operative. Such “quasi-
populisms” must involve agrarian populations facing hostile socio-structural conditions 
similar to those of their 1880s-90s American counterparts (the more similar, the bet-
ter) in the context of a changing socioeconomic environment where industrialization 
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imposes a power shift away from traditional rural communities. Hence, the Russian 
Narodniki (Venturi 1960), the German Farmers League (Barkin 1970), the Polish Peas-
ant Movement (Narkiewicz 1976), and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (Bell 
1977), would qualify for the populist family. However, one should not expect to find 
populism outside rural communities or in places where industrialization has already 
negated the political relevance of agrarian societies. Given such premises, it becomes 
unreasonable to insist on the existence of populist forces in modern, fully industrialized 
societies.2 
A similar trail of thought is observed among the first generation of Latin American 
populism scholars and their few contemporary disciples. Here, however, the argument 
– though retaining its structural bias – is transformed with respect to the social agent 
of populist agitation. Certain characteristics of agrarian populism, such as the sensitivi-
ty to the disruptive force of industrialization, urbanization, and the general thrust of 
modernization, remain intact, but the usual victims – the agrarian populations of the 
hinterland – are substituted for urban dwellers in burgeoning national metropoles. In-
stead of the People’s Party, early populist episodes in South America (basically, Peron-
ism in the 1940s) are promoted to ideal-typical status. With references in functionalist 
sociology, modernization theory, and mass society theory, populism is seen as the out-
come of a situation where certain sectors of society fail to keep up with the impact of 
rapid industrialization. This asymmetrical development, the “premature emergence of 
a mass society” (Hennessy 1969, 31), produces fissures in the structure of political rep-
resentation of societal interests, thus allowing charismatic outsiders to attract the sup-
port of an amorphous mass of marginalized and disenfranchised urban citizens. Politi-
cal leaders whose electoral ascendancy was conditioned by social forces of this nature 
qualify as populists. 
These first three viewpoints, presented loosely above as members of the same 
school of thought, are characterized by a distinctly structural appreciation of historical 
progress. The focus is squarely on the macro level, causal factors are prioritized over 
phenomenological observations, and social stratification becomes the crucible of polit-
ical behavior. The role of human agency generally takes a back seat: individuals, leaders 
and led alike, are unable to influence the course of developments, swept away as they 
are by the inexorable forces of history. Due to their deterministic aura, such epistemo-
logical assumptions have always been in tension with an understanding of bottom-up 
 
2 Scholars from different schools have tried to retain insights from this literature while avoiding the trap of 
succumbing to a strict association of populism with agitation amongst farming populations. This is 
achieved by invoking a downgraded species of “agrarian populism” among a wider family comprising the 
populist genus (e.g. Canovan 1981; Mudde 2000). 
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social mobilization as an agentic, rational, and strategic political undertaking that ex-
hibits a rich cultural content (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). They are also fairly at odds 
with strictly rational-choice models that put the focus on individual ideologico-political 
attitudes as represented in the arena of electoral competition. 
 
 
2.2 Institutionalist Approaches 
 
The second major family of populism theory is less macro-structural in its outlook 
and somewhat more appreciative of the pull of ideas at the meso and micro level. 
Based on theories of party system institutionalization, voter representation, cleavage 
formation, and issue ownership, this school of thought interprets Populism as the pro-
grammatic adumbration of a specific political ideology espoused by People’s Party ac-
tivists and politicians like William Jennings Bryan. According to this rationale, Bryan is 
considered a populist because major planks of his unconventional political platform – 
the lack of respect for established procedures, the support for an unorthodox mone-
tary policy, the attacks against banking and other business interests, the intention to 
overhaul the structure of political representation, the obviation of moderate political 
conduct – would disrupt checks and balances and the rule of law, impairing the health 
of the American system of government by rupturing the integrity of these most basic 
institutions of representative democracy.  
Using the original Populist experience as a model, institutionalists have inferred a set 
of core populist ideological dimensions by surveying the area of overlap between the 
programmatic manifestos of the People’s Party and the preferences of its voters. We 
can thus distill a laundry list of populist traits (see, e.g., Shils 1956 for perhaps the ear-
liest iteration) by which we can then decouple the concept from its historical womb, 
applying it deductively across time and space to examine populist ideology with re-
spect to political leaders, parties, or even individual voters with little or no organic rela-
tion with the original Populists. The choice of traits may vary, but what remains fixed is 
that populism acquires meaning only when studied as a destabilizing element vis-à-vis 
a certain pillar of institutionalized government, be it a party system, the electoral pro-
cess, a political regime, an economic order, or a constitutional arrangement. Since 
populism is a paragon of discontinuity that can only upend, disrupt, and subvert an ex-
isting status quo, institutionalist scholars frequently adopt a normative tone in their ef-
fort to raise awareness about the deleterious impact of populist agitation on the insti-
tutions of liberal democracy. 
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Presently, there is no general agreement within this school of thought with regards 
to the exact ideological precepts of populism, its necessary and sufficient dimensions, 
its fit with democratic norms, and its policy implications. Various elements have been 
suggested as capturing the “true” essence of populist ideology, ranging from a focus on 
economic policy (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991), to attitudes toward pluralist institu-
tions (Müller 2016; Urbinati 2019), to the treatment of minorities (Norris and Inglehart 
2019). In some cases, populism is framed as comprising an ideological package coher-
ent enough to warrant its study as a mode of political representation or as a type of 
political regime (see e.g. Caramani 2017; Pappas 2019). Expanding its reach into the 
demand side, a subgroup specializes in constructing attitudinal indexes to test the 
prevalence of populist ideology within a given constituency by means of public opinion 
surveys (e.g. Castanho Silva et al., 2019). 
Admittedly, such a wide spectrum of opinion clearly negates any sort of facile abbre-
viation. The numerous researchers who work within its purview have been able to of-
fer valuable insights into an immense variety of research questions. Unfortunately, 
their toolset of choice is exclusively tailored to fit political manifestations of the institu-
tionalized type, with the political party or its leader representing the preferred unit of 
analysis in a context where the electoral cycle monopolizes the setting of the tone for 
political contestation. Little if any investment is put into understanding how populist 
mobilization succeeds in capturing hearts and minds, how it combines political claims 
of a strictly materialistic nature with elements of local culture based on feelings of in-
justice, or how it infuses the former with a distinctly primal democratic pathos. When 
ordinary citizens are involved in the analysis, their views are collected as isolated data 
points for statistical manipulation while their grievances remain demobilized by de-
fault. It is only when hierarchical organizations and ballot boxes enter the picture that 
institutionalists begin to take stock of the populist phenomenon. Inevitably, our scope 
is limited to populism’s institutional outcomes, diverting analysis away from the study 
of intermediary mechanisms of populist agitation such as strategic intent, the negotia-
tion of social grievances, processes of identity formation, and the role of culture and 
emotions. 
 
 
2.3 Discursive appreciations 
 
As with the second, the third and final major perspective – favored mostly by politi-
cal scientists and theorists – reiterates that capital-P Populism was just one case within 
a much larger set of small-p populisms. Important as it was for giving the group a 
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name, American Populism was not the earliest populist movement, nor was Bryan the 
first populist to ever win the spotlight, so we cannot therefore limit the concept to the 
People’s Party’s members and voters. The focus, however, is not on macro-structural 
shifts, nor on a purported set of ideological features of Populism and their implications 
for the institutional framework. It is rather the discursive form that becomes the defin-
ing criterion of populist mobilization (Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). This approach priori-
tizes the mediating role of language, framing, and narrative, in the process of social 
construction, while emphasizing the importance of the culturally-bound political vo-
cabulary that populists utilize in their effort to induce mobilization.  
In terms of research methods, proponents of this view analyze textual products to 
decide if a political actor has, out of the myriad ways available to politicize social griev-
ances, opted to construct reality as a dualistic struggle between “the people” – the in-
group of choice – and those “elites” who distort the system to advance their narrow 
interests. The actor who systematically resorts to populist discourse can then be la-
belled a populist, since the conjuring of this specific socio-political imaginary becomes 
central for purposes of political mobilization. Hence, it was neither the official en-
dorsement of the People’s Party nor his policy proposal that made Bryan a populist, 
but his decision to base his political project on constructing a catch-all identity of a 
“people” unjustly stripped of their sovereignty through the deliberate perversion of the 
system by a self-serving elite of the Eastern Seabord. Whether he was “truly” a populist 
or whether he invested in this binary social construction for strategic purposes is an in-
teresting question but at the same time a moot one for purposes of analytical classifi-
cation.3 
This latter point opens up the group to the criticism that behind their nominally dis-
cursive and cultural appreciation of the populist phenomenon lies an overly behavioral 
approach where form is accentuated to the point of discounting valuable observations 
about populism’s organizational, institutional, and ideological implications. Most schol-
ars of the discursive school would respond by at least partly accepting this as a feature 
rather than a handicap. Deference to the principle of popular sovereignty is acknowl-
edged as the touchstone for the “people’s” moral advantage over unscrupulous 
“elites.” But this rudimentary forma mentis is not consistent with what many institu-
tionalists see as the marking of a formal political ideology or an otherwise coherent 
programmatic agenda. The sociopolitical output of populist mobilization is open-
 
3 Taking the argument a step further, an important subgroup within this camp casts discourse as operating 
more widely than mere rhetoric, adding elements of style (e.g., gestures, attire, mannerisms, etc.) as 
important markers of populism (Knight 1998; Moffitt 2016) and thus introducing cultural elements into the 
analysis.  
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ended; it refuses to adhere to strict policy norms or to produce patterned outcomes as 
with an ideologically conscious program of action. Therefore, the continuities that oth-
er schools of thought indicate with regards to party organization, institutional break-
down, and so on, are circumstantial artifacts that cannot be allowed definitional status.  
To study populism is then to abstract a specific discursive behavior – an antiestab-
lishment discourse in the name of the “people” – and to employ it deductively in 
search of populist instances around the world, including phenomena that predate the 
rise of the Farmers’ Alliances in the American context. The flexibility of the populist dis-
cursive trope, which, importantly, manifests in grades rather than in an on-off form, 
allows political and cultural agents (parties, leaders, movements, the media, artists, 
etc.) to use it in collecting disparate grievances under a single tent. Hence, in disa-
greement with the historicist or structuralist approach, no specific class or other socio-
logical entity can be prioritized as the main locus of populist mobilization. 
 
 
3. The regional divide among institutionalists: Europeanists vs Latin American-
ists 
 
Classifications rely on perspective. Bryan’s yardstick surely fails to account for every 
single division produced by the different research agendas out there. 4 A regionally 
conscious glance at the literature of the last couple of decades reveals a further cleav-
age within the institutionalist camp that merits ad hoc treatment. The cleavage is be-
tween scholars of Latin American politics who study populism as a radical left-wing 
phenomenon in presidential party systems, and their European peers who evaluate it 
as an instance of radical right-wing politics in multiparty parliamentary democracies. 
First, there is the troubling issue of the unit of analysis. When the word “populism” is 
uttered in a Latin American context it is hard to avoid conjuring up the image of a 
flamboyant President (predominantly male), colorful sash hanging from his right shoul-
der, waving triumphantly to a sea of raving crowds from the balcony of his presidential 
 
4 Notably, many important contributions seem to straddle the divides or to mix-and-match elements taken 
from all three camps, as presented here. For instance, Mudde’s (2004) influential classification of populism 
under the genus of “thin-centered ideology,” an idea first suggested by Margaret Canovan (2002), belongs 
ostensibly to the second camp. However, since no clear ideological or programmatic dimensions are 
actually suggested, and since a “people versus elites” tension over popular sovereignty is posited as 
constitutive of populism, Mudde’s (2004; 2007) work occupies a spot within the grey zone between the 
institutional and the discursive. Similarly, Hawkins (2010) adopts a nominally discursive take on populism, 
but his work is mostly geared towards the analysis of institutional outcomes. 
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palace. Populism is regarded as a one-man show. The emphasis on the executive is of 
such paramount importance that it fosters a slew of near-onomatopoetic varieties of 
the phenomenon: Peronismo, Varguismo, Gaitanismo, Kirchnerismo, Fujimorismo, 
Chavismo, and so on.  
What holds this corpus together is an appreciation of populist mobilization as a 
strictly top-down phenomenon that inhibits the development of institutionalized party 
bureaucracies. The spellbinding protagonist bypasses mediating institutions to appeal 
directly to unorganized, atomized constituencies (de la Torre and Arnson 2013), oper-
ating as a master manipulator of diffuse resentment who takes advantage of the elec-
toral process to pursue a personalistic agenda that erodes the proper function of politi-
cal representation. This perspective colors the Latin American breed of populism with 
an aura of a “this is not how politics should be done” quality. “Under populism,” Kurt 
Weyland (2001, 13) states in a widely-cited paper, “the ruler is an individual, that is, a 
personalistic leader” and “the connection between leader and followers is based most-
ly on direct, quasi-personal contact, not on organizational intermediation.” Striking a 
similar note, Levitsky and Loxton (2013, 110) argue that populists are outsiders who 
“mobilize mass support via anti-establishment appeals” by means of a “personalistic 
linkage to voters, circumventing parties and other forms of institutional mediation.” 
The Weberian notion of charismatic – as opposed to rational-legal – authority under-
girds the theorization of this linkage: populists, Conniff (2012, 7) declares axiomatically, 
are “leaders who had charismatic relationships with mass followings and who won 
elections regularly.” An unmediated, emotional, psychological, quasi-mystical relation-
ship between leader and led is generally regarded as the common core of all populist 
episodes in Latin American history. 
This rationale inevitably renders populist politics incompatible with the representa-
tion of societal interests through established institutional structures, a function tradi-
tionally assigned to political parties: “By contrast to the strong organization provided 
by an institutionalized party and the stable connections established by patron-client 
ties,” Weyland (2001, 13) says, “the relationship between populist leaders and their 
mass constituency is uninstitutionalized and fluid.” Here lies the analytical cleavage 
with Europeanists on whose ears this type of statement rings strange, given that they 
tend to focus specifically on the political party as their unit of analysis. Furthermore, 
the stipulated need for strong and unmediated leadership, “charismatic” or not, seems 
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at odds with the concrete reality of European populist affairs (Mudde and Rovira Kalt-
wasser 2014; Pappas 2016a).5  
The conceptual divergence becomes starker when the clause of “broad mass sup-
port” of an electoral nature is taken seriously enough to become “the ultima ratio of 
[Latin American] populism” (Weyland 2001, 12). Steep levels of electoral backing for 
the populist agent are not a given in Europe, where the average populist party seldom 
manages to enlist popular majorities. Passing the five percent mark in national polls 
usually spells “breakthrough” for a European populist party, allowing practitioners to 
incorporate the newcomer into their datasets (e.g. Mudde 2007).6 So, on the one hand 
we have images of populist presidents in Latin America who are swept to power on the 
backs of popular majorities, and on the other, we have experts spending their whole 
careers laboring over populist parties with meager political influence over European 
society. 
How can we explain the thorough lack of rapport between the two regions? Perhaps 
cultural or historical factors play their role, but the more obvious culprit is a basic dif-
ference in the system of government. In countries with presidential systems, executive 
power naturally ends up in the hands of a single person. Political parties still matter at 
the congressional level, but in the eyes of the public, electoral campaigns are fought 
between presidential contestants. Analysts accustomed to such a setting are under-
standably prone to associate populism with individual politicians rather than their par-
ties. To take the United States as a clear example, several presidents or presidential 
candidates have been designated as populists (e.g., Donald Trump, Ronald Reagan, Pat 
Buchanan, George McGovern, George Wallace, Theodore Roosevelt, Andrew Jackson, 
and Thomas Jefferson), and scholars have even claimed that the whole character of 
American politics is fundamentally populist (Hofstadter 1955). However, rarely does 
anyone go on to brand the Republican or the Democratic Party as such. The two politi-
cal organizations are conceived as durable institutional and ideological substrates upon 
which a politician may potentially (and temporarily) erect a populist superstructure, yet 
 
5 The usual populist suspects in the very heart of Europe – e.g. the Front National in France, the SVP in 
Switzerland, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Lega in Italy, or the FPÖ in Austria – have been contesting 
elections uninterruptedly for the last thirty to forty years, under different leaders. We can hardly refuse to 
designate these parties as populist merely because they may lack leaders falling within the “great leader” 
trope. At best, the argument over whether populism requires personalistic leadership is trivial, boiling 
down to the truism that a party with a popular leader at the helm enjoys better electoral prospects. At 
worst, the argument is spurious, since no control group is ever employed to test it: personalistic leadership 
may plausibly benefit all sorts of political campaigning, not just the populist type. 
6 According to my calculations, the average electoral strength of populist right-wing parties in Mudde 
(2007) is 12.9%. In an updated version of his dataset, the average drops further to 9.6% (Mudde 2013). 
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the populist element never seems to become entrenched enough to justify calling the 
entire party “populist.” European critics therefore charge that the study of populism in 
the Americas has been forced to fit the institutional structure of the region, thereby 
distorting the phenomenon’s true proportions. The assertion that populism is “a ques-
tion of who gains public office and how they govern” (Conniff 2012, 2) hinders compar-
ison with democracies of the parliamentary type where the political party is used as 
the main unit of analysis.7  
The conceptual disjunction between Americanists and Europeanists comes starkly to 
the fore in a recent chapter for The Oxford Handbook of Populism, where Weyland 
(2017, 62) stands his analytical ground, and in defiance to the rest of the volume’s au-
thors goes on to claim that “much of Europe’s right-wing radicalism may be a different 
‘political animal’ and not fall under populism.” According to this most influential schol-
ar of Latin American populism, archetypal cases in the European literature like the 
Front National or the Vlaams Belang are too institutionalized and too unsuccessful to 
pass the bar. Genuine populists are non-ideological actors, notorious for their oppor-
tunism, whereas the leaders of European right-wing radicalism, on the contrary, are in-
flexible and dogmatic, and their personalism is “ideocratic.” 
Weyland’s argument rests on criteria I have strongly protested in the previous para-
graphs, but this does not mean his final assessment is necessarily incorrect. The knee-
jerk identification of every European right-wing radical or extremist as a “populist” is of 
late receiving justified criticism for indiscriminately lumping together phenomena of a 
different substance and caliber that should remain analytically separated (e.g., De 
Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017; Pappas 2016b; Stavrakakis et al. 2017). At the same time, 
it suggests another dimension of the gulf between European and Latin American schol-
arship, this time pertaining to populism’s ideological valence. Latin America, the “hot-
bed” of radical left-wing populism (Castaneda 2006), stands at the opposite end of the 
ideological spectrum from Europe, the den of radical right-wing populists (Caiani and 
Císař 2019; Heinisch et al. 2017; Mudde 2007). The reasons here are mostly socio-
 
7 For a thorough analysis of this Americanist “bias”, see Aslanidis (2017). The reluctance to apply the Latin 
American theoretical paradigm in Europe was revealed during the 2017 French presidential election. 
Emmanuel Macron donned an outsider persona and mobilized a vehement anti-establishment discourse, 
winning the Presidency on the basis of a purely uninstitutionalized linkage with voters, since his 
personalistic electoral vehicle – the En Marche party – was still in the cards. During the campaign Macron 
even acquiesced to being qualified as a populist if that meant “talking to the people in a comprehensible 
manner without the intermediation of mechanisms,” a behavior he contrasted to that of the demagogue 
who merely “flatters the people” (Macron 2017). Even though Macron was the one who ticked many of 
the boxes, it was his far less popular or charismatic foe, Marine Le Pen, that won exclusive coverage as the 
populist candidate. 
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historical and ideological. Long-standing socioeconomic inequalities in South American 
societies have traditionally led to anti-establishment appeals primarily emerging from 
the left side of the political spectrum. After a brief but important interlude in the early 
1990s when “neo-populists” with pro-free-market agendas won power in Argentina, 
Peru, and Brazil (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996), the association between populism and 
left-wing politics re-emerged at the turn of the century, with left-wing populist leaders 
such as Chavez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia, and Correa in Ecuador breathing new 
life into the Latin American populist literature.  
In Western European circles, the absence of a patterned sequence of anti-
establishment challenges to the dominance of Christian-Democratic and Social-
Democratic parties in the post-war setting had rendered the concept of populism irrel-
evant in public and academic discourse, despite the existence of a far right undercur-
rent in many nations.8 When, for instance, Enoch Powell shocked Britain with his “Riv-
ers of Blood” speech in April 1968, no one thought of denouncing him as “a populist”. 
The terms “racist,” “demagogue,” or “nationalist” captured the substance of his politi-
cal message well enough at the time. European scholars only began to employ the term 
reluctantly in the mid-1980s and more fervently after the mid-1990s when burgeoning 
far right parties such as the Front National, the Republikaner, and the FPÖ received 
treatment as manifestations of national-populisme in France (Taguieff 1984) and 
Rechtspopulismus in Germanic-speaking countries, wedding populism firmly with ex-
tremism on the right, thereby sparking a long trail of influential scholarship as such par-
ties began to multiply across the continent (e.g. Betz 1994). The association – un-
doubtedly influenced by the European trauma of fascism – has since remained a fixture 
of almost every political formation to the right of mainstream conservatives in Europe-
an party systems. Thus, when Latin Americanists speak of (left-wing) populism, they in-
voke a traditionally socioeconomic understanding of left versus right. In the European 
context, the debate around (right-wing) populism reflects socio-cultural attitudes 
where xenophobia and nativism overshadow questions on the role of the state in the 
national economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Greece was an important exception; see the early work by Mouzelis (1978). Green parties challenged the 
establishment in several Western European countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, but political 
analysts seldom saw value in emphasizing their populist characteristics, perhaps due to the lack of a 
proper theoretical framework in Europe at the time. 
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4. Making room for culture 
 
Having laid out a conceptual grid to describe the main tensions in the literature of 
populism we can now proceed to contribute to the main topic of this special issue: the 
field’s disappointing attention to cultural aspects of populist mobilization (Caiani and 
Padoan, this issue). By design, institutionalist and structuralist approaches are rather 
unconcerned with cultural explorations of political contention. The sole direction of-
fered on that end is through an identification of “right-wing populism” with ultra-
nationalist or nativist sentiment that is to be subsequently analyzed through the lens of 
culture. However, this interpretation frequently misreads the populist call for the resti-
tution of popular sovereignty by equating it with a call for national sovereignty that 
may follow an aggressively and primordially cultural – nativist, ethnic, or even racist – 
logic, thus overlooking the democratic and egalitarian core of the populist plea and its 
crucial anti-elitist component, and thereby missing the opportunity to study how cul-
tural themes inform it.9 
Moreover, as I argued earlier, institutionalists on both sides of the Atlantic leave no 
space for populism as a grassroots phenomenon, a striking omission given that Popu-
lism emerged historically as a popular movement to only become institutionalized in 
the People’s Party at a later stage. Social grievances, ideologies, values, cultural norms, 
and other elements with a potential for politicization, can equally find expression with-
in and without an electoral vehicle, and it is most frequently in the non-institutional 
domain that culture reverberates the strongest. It is not only culturally rich social 
movements that are left out when populism becomes anchored to a dominant leader 
or a political party but also journalism and forms of politically-conscious art. The inter-
esting debates on “media populism” (Mazzoleni 2008), or on the populist literature of 
Hamlin Garland (Brown 1994), L. Frank Baum (Littlefield 1964), and John Steinbeck 
(Simkins 2006), or on the populist cinematography of Frank Capra (Phelps 1979), and 
the influence of Populist poetry on American folk music (Eyerman and Jamison 1998) 
would be rendered non-sensical in the very fields where we expect culture to play a 
particularly crucial role. 
The discursive school offers a more hospitable venue for introducing culture into the 
study of populism. Elements of local and national culture pop up regularly in analyses 
of populist discourse, from the way elites are criticized and often ridiculed as culturally 
 
9 Populism and nationalism may at times overlap but that should not allow a haphazard blurring of the 
lines between them. On the need to retain a distinction between nationalism and populism see De Cleen 
and Stavrakakis (2017) as well as Brubaker’s (2019) rebuke. Gamper Sachse (2018) analyzes empirically 
how the two forms of identity construction interact in the case of Catalonian independence. 
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distant from “ordinary people” for the way they talk, their attire, their stylized table 
manners, their lavish lifestyles, their culinary tastes, their preference for the “high” arts 
and so on, to the populist veneration of the folksy ways of the “common man” that 
symbolize the authenticity and egalitarian ethos of the underdog. While these discur-
sive features are on occasion pertinent for top-down populist projects (see e.g. Moffitt 
2016; Ostiguy 2017), it is still the organizational, structural, electoral, and attitudinal 
dimensions that scholars of party-system populism predominantly seek to dissect in 
their work, with culture acting as the occasional mediator.  
On the contrary, episodes of grassroots populist mobilization, where populism 
comes in the form of a social movement rather than a hierarchical, electorally-
conscious organization, offer us a unique opportunity to study the interaction with cul-
tural social products, given that social movements are pregnant with symbolic meaning 
as their activists consciously or unconsciously draw from the rich pool of cultural norms 
and symbolisms in order to mobilize citizens for their causes (Aslanidis 2016a, 2018; 
Caiani and Císař 2019). The populist movements of the Great Recession in Iceland, 
Spain, Greece, Israel, and the United States, the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, the Hong 
Kong Umbrella Revolution, the Yellow Vest movement in France, the Sudanese Revolu-
tion, and the recent movements in Lebanon and Iraq, all contain heaps of evidence 
pointing to the dominant role of culture in the construction of populist identity. Popu-
list culture has been repeatedly forged and enacted in streets and squares by unnamed 
activists to then remain in abeyance for future generations of grassroots populists once 
the current agitation subsides. From the messages written on banners and placards, to 
the chants they compose, the slogans they shout, their flags and even the name they 
choose for their causes, populist movement entrepreneurs are conscious that the qual-
ity of cultural capital invested in their struggle matters greatly in the successful con-
struction of a catch-all narrative to unite “the people” above partisan, ethnic, religious, 
class, and other divides. 
In this sense, scholars interested in culture and populism have much to learn from 
the vast literature that social movement experts have produced over the past decades. 
A most promising avenue, commensurate with a discursive take on populism, is the lit-
erature on collective action framing, introduced by sociologist David Snow and his as-
sociates in the late-1980s. To put this literature to work in the service of populism stud-
ies, we must switch to a social movement perspective and define populism as a type of 
collective action frame, that is, an action-oriented interpretation of reality that frames 
popular grievances as the outcome of an unjust erosion of popular sovereignty perpe-
trated by manipulating elites (Aslanidis 2016a, 2016b, 2018). Thus, we will be able to 
assess the significance of culture as a contributing factor in a process of meaning-
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making termed “frame alignment” (Snow et al. 1986; Zuo and Benford 1995). Move-
ment activists employ this process to compile building blocks of symbolic matter that 
allow them to adjust the populist frame of the movement – the people versus elites 
trope – to popular aspirations. How this works is briefly explained in the paragraphs 
below. 
Theories of collective action usually begin with dispelling the misconception that 
“objective” societal grievances automatically yield a specific political reaction on the 
part of those affected as macro-structural or overly economistic views would hold. 
Agency, through skill, creativity, and strategy, intervenes to inspire action by construct-
ing and broadcasting a resonant frame that “explains” what is going on out there as the 
product of specific human forces. Before citizens can be mobilized, grievances need to 
be emphasized and amplified, their emotive potential leveraged to work alongside 
cognitive evaluations. To do that, a collective action frame must align its interpretation 
of the situation with individual orientations, so that “some set of individual interests, 
values and beliefs and [social movement] activities, goals, and ideology are congruent 
and complementary” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). The goal of narrative fidelity becomes a 
crucial component: successful framing efforts “resonate with cultural narrations, that 
is, with the stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of one’s cultural her-
itage and that thus function to inform events and experiences in the immediate pre-
sent” (Snow and Benford 1988, 210). 
In the case of populist mobilization, the articulation of blame needs to be sharpened 
toward a single point of failure in the system at the highest possible level, contributing 
to a narrative that recognizes “elites” as culprits and “the people” as victims, chiseling 
away competing causal interpretations based on traditional sociopolitical cleavages of 
a sectarian nature. At the same time, populists cannot rely exclusively on a dry, juridi-
cal invocation of a vigilant people-as-sovereign to instigate a political insurgency. “The 
people” cannot simply come together in union at a skin-deep, procedural level. The 
otherwise latent belief in the value of popular sovereignty provides a useful substrate 
for collective action, but activists still need resonant symbolic markers and cultural mo-
tifs to crystallize the notion of “a people” acting in concert against injustice. 
Culture enters the picture as an instrument of frame alignment by providing symbol-
ic and emotive tissue to help glue together the otherwise disparate political 
worldviews that temporarily coalesce within a populist movement. When one wishes 
to establish unyielding popular unity against a common elite enemy, knocking down 
the disruptive salience of class identity, ideological beliefs, material interests, gender, 
or even religious sentiment and ethnic make-up, culture can work as the linchpin to 
align and set in motion an audience of colorful ideological and social make-up. Citizens 
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are deeply imbedded in a system of cultural codes that can be mobilized to substanti-
ate a distance from usurping elites; and since movements are both “consumers of ex-
isting cultural meanings and producers of new meanings” (Tarrow 1992, 189), “the 
people” will witness and contribute to cultural breakthroughs of a recalcitrant, anti-
establishment nature right there on the spot where populist collective identity is con-
structed anew, thus galvanizing a feeling of camaraderie, establishing trust, and 
strengthening the resolve to stand together until the movement fulfills its redemptive 
mission. 
Methodologically, frame analysis is helpfully in tune with studies of populist dis-
course in that it also relies on analyzing textual data – in a broad sense – to understand 
framing processes (Johnston 2005; Vicari 2010). This is done primarily by recourse to 
qualitative assessments, while also allowing quantitative explorations. Due to its infre-
quency and its usually short duration, grassroots mobilization is logistically cumber-
some to analyze as compared to the study of party system politics. However, relying on 
the tried-and-tested literature on frame theory and the process of frame alignment as 
a theoretical framework, a research agenda that engages with the cultural aspect of 
populist mobilization has at its disposal a range of reliable research practices. Partici-
pant observation, interview data, the analysis of movement manifestos, assembly 
minutes, pamphlets, mottos, banners, and chants, all help to uncover how culture 
serves as a contributing factor in constructing and buttressing an emergent populist 
identity.  
The spotty nature of social mobilization is no excuse for ignoring the numerous epi-
sodes of grassroots populism in favor of the electoral manifestations of the phenome-
non. Perhaps the greatest hurdle moving forward is the mutual reluctance between po-
litical scientists and sociologists to delve into each other’s literature to borrow and 
build upon existing concepts and methods. The publication of this special issue is an 
encouraging signal that such a cooperation is not only feasible but also advantageous 
to both camps. 
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